The Political Economy of Hegemonic Contestation and Military Coup D’état in the Niger Republic

Abstract

This study advances a theoretical account of the precise mechanism by which multipolar great-power patronage, particularly unconditional Russian security support and Chinese economic engagement, neutralizes the deterrent effect of normative regional sanctions, thereby lowering the perceived costs of unconstitutional power seizure in Francophone West Africa. The resurgence of military coups in the region between 2020 and 2024, most notably in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, represents a critical rupture in the region's postcolonial political architecture, coinciding with intensifying hegemonic rivalry between the traditional United States–France Atlantic alliance and an expanding Russia–China bloc. While existing literature extensively documents micro-level internal vulnerabilities, including institutional fragility, elite corruption, and failed democratic dividends, it leaves a significant empirical gap regarding how indirect hegemonic contestation over strategic geo-economic assets alters the strategic calculations of domestic military factions. Using the Niger Republic as the epicenter case, the study triangulates thematic analysis of 30 purposively selected elite interviews spanning diplomats, military scholars, policy analysts, and government, ECOWAS, and African Union officials against documentary evidence from ECOWAS, the African Union, the European Union, and junta communications. The study is theoretically anchored in an explicit three-tier nested framework integrating World-Systems Theory as the macro-structural container, Geoeconomic Theory as the mediating instrument, and classical realist Power Theory as the micro-level driver of military decision-making. Findings reveal that while internal micro-grievances, including weak civilian control over the military, elite capture, and chronic poverty amid resource wealth, precipitated the July 2023 coup, macro-level hegemonic contestation provided the necessary conditions for its consolidation and survival. The proposed Nigeria–Morocco Gas Pipeline emerged as a critical sovereignty flashpoint and geo-economic bargaining chip within this dynamic. The study formalizes a five-mechanism model of proxy rivalry, including alternative security partnerships, resource-for-security deals, diplomatic cover, counter-sanctions, and institutional fragmentation, and characterizes these coups as a form of primitive accumulation by force, transitioning states from a Franco-centric extraction model toward multipolar patronage arrangements. The study recommends that ECOWAS and the African Union transition from blanket economic embargoes toward targeted sanctions against external paramilitary intermediaries and their local enablers, that Western powers pivot toward performance-based economic incentive frameworks, and that infrastructure agreements such as the Nigeria–Morocco Gas Pipeline embed binding anti-coup and governance clauses.